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Utilities in developing countries may want to consider a success-
ful new approach to improving performance: engaging a per-
formance contractor to improve their operations-in  exchange
for a share of the savings.  The utility, in turn, fulfills its own
performance contract with the government - getting more
autonomy in exchange for better performance.
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In the United States, some large industrial and  Why not merge the two concepts?
commercial energy users have successfully used
energy performance contractors to effect energy  A utility could engage a performance
savings in exchange for a share of the savings.  contractor to improve operations in exchange for
a share of the ,avings - thereby allowing the
In some developing countries, governments  utility to fulfill its performance contract with the
have considered various forms of govemment/  government. The government would give the
utility performance contract, whereby the  utility more autonomy in exchange for better
governments give the utilities more flexibility  performance.
and autonomy in exchange for better perform-
ance.
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IN THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
THROUGH  PERFORMANCE  CONTRACTING
by
Philip  Yat  s
I.  Introduction  and  gummary.
It  is generally  recognized that  electric  utility
systems in the developing countries are less efficient than
utility  systems  in  developed  countries. 2 Many  developing
country utilities can improve their efficiency at relatively
low  cost,  through  better  plan.ning, improved  maintenance
procedures,  adequate  stocks  of  critical  spare  parts,  and
increased  training  of  utility  personnel. 3 In  short,
improving the  operation of  existing  facilities may  be  the
most attractive energy investment available to a utility in a
developing country.
While  there  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  these
operational def:Lciencies,  the core problem is institutional.
Developing  country  utilities  are  usually  government-owned,
and over-control by government frequently leads to decisions
that  conflict with  good  operational  practice.  Because  of
these  institutional  barriers,  developing  countries  cannot
improve  utility  efficiency  simply  by  spending  more  money.
Any money  allocated to improve utility efficiency should be
spent as part  of a program that increases the chances that
(1)  funds  are  expended  appropriately,  (2)  personnel  are
1.  Philip Yates, 3502 N.E. Flanders, Portland, Oregon,
97232,  is an attorney and energy  consultant who has worked
extensively  on  energy  performance  contracts  in  the  United  States.
2.  C.  Tabet  and  R.  Skjoeldebrand,  "Unavailability
Factors  of  Thermal  Generating  Plant  and  Availability
Statistics,  13th  Congress  of  the  World  Energy  Conference,
October 5-11, Cannes, France.
3.  "Power system efficiency" is used in this paper  in
its broadest possible sense, to include availability factors,
power  plant  fuel  efficiency,  line/distribution  losses,
billing procedures and administrative overhead.2
trained, and  (3) trained people stay at their jobs after
training.
The  "performance  contract"  concept  may  be  a
potential  solution  to  this  institutional  problem.  There  are
two basic  forms  of this  kind  of contract  that  are relevant  to
thius  naper.
1.  Private  sector  "energy  performance  contracts"
have  been used by  large industrial  and commercial  energy
users to lower  their energy  bills  with little  or no capital
outlay.  The  energy performance contractor provides the
engineering, capital, and  ongoing maintenance needed  to
derive energy savings through the  installation  of energy
efficiency  devices  or equipment,  e.g.  a heat exchanger  on an
industrial  boiler.  In exchange for this investment,  the
energy  performance  contractor  receives  a  share  of  the  energy
savings  that  are  generated  over  the  length  of  the  contract.
2.  The  term  "performance  contract"  has  also  been
used  to  describe  an  arrangement  between  a  goverrment-owned
utility  and its central  government,  under  which  ~  ¢.central
government agrees to  provide greater freedom  utility
management, e.g. an exemption from civil service  . ations,
in exchange for the  improved  performance  of thk;  uitility.
This  type  of "performance  contract"  has  been  used  in  a  number
of  countries as a means of targeting and monitoring the
performance  of  government-owned  organizations such  as
utilities.4
This paper discusses the concept of merging the
private  sector  energy  performance  contract  with  the
government/utility  performance  contract  to form  the basis of
a  program  that can solve  some of the institutional  problems
that inhibit the efficient  operation  of many utilities in
developing  countries.
Section II contains  a discussion  of the potential
for  improving the  efficiency of  utilities in developing
countries,  the various  types  of energy  performance  contracts
that  have  been  used  by  the  private  sector,  the
government/utility  performance  contract model, and utility
twinning. Section  III outlines  the potential  synergy  between
private sector performance  contracts  and government/utility
4.  For  the  private  sector  energy  performance  contract,
an  energy  performance  contract  usually  creates  a benefit for
the  building  or  facility  owner  by  reducing  energy
consumption.  In the  utility  context,  the  benefit  is  more
likely  to  be  increased production rather than  reduced
consumption.3
performance  contracts. Section  IV addresses  the design  of a
potential pilot project to  test this  potential synergy.
Section  V contains  the conclusion  of the paper.  A sample
contract between a government  agency and a private sector
energy  perforimance  contractor  is contained  in  the Appendix.
II.  Background.
A.  The  Potential  for  Private Sector  Involvement in
Developina  Country  Utilities.
A precondition  to private  sector  participation  in a
part  .cular  market  is  the  opportunity  to  make  a  profit.
For,.nately,  there  are obvious  money-making  opportunities  in
improving  the efficiency  of developing  country  utilities. If
adequate  foreign  exchange is available,  these opportunities
could  attract  private  energy  performance  contractors.
For example, based on a survey conducted  by the
World Energy Conference,  the average "availability  factor"
(the percentage  of time a generating  plant is capable of
service) for 100-199 MW generating units in the U.S. is 81%.
In contrast, the average availability for the same class of
plant in the developing countries is 75%.5  While the average
differences are not as great for larger units, the averages
obscure the  extremes.  In India,  for example, availability
averages  66-70%, with  some  units  below  50%.6  Conversely,
many  European  and  North  American  utilities  are  able  to
achieve availability factors in excess of 85%.
The  economic  impact  of  low  availability  is
staggering.  A  1% improvement in a 320 MW coal-fired unit's
availability factor can reduce costs by US$500,000 a year.7
For  larger  units,  the  losses  are  even  more  severe.  For
example,  losing  a  550  MW  plant  for  a  day  can  cost
5  Id., note 1.
6.  S.A.  Subramanian,  "Management of  Availability  in
Operation,"  World  Energy  Conference,  Rome,  Italy,  28-31
October, 1985.
7.  G. Galli,  "Availability Management: The Experience
of  ENEL,"  World  Energy  Conference,  Rome,  Italy,  28-31
October, 1985.4
US$240,000,8 while  losing a  600-700 MW plant for a day can
cost US$300,000.9
These  losses  result  from  replacing  power  from  a
"down" plant with power  from a plant that is less efficient
and/or  uses  a  more  expensive  fuel,  e.g.  replacing  a  unit
fired with domestic coal with a unit fired with imported oil.
However,  for  man.  utilities, an  even larger  price  is paid
indirectly through reduced economic activity caused by poor
power  quality  and  blackouts.  Blackouts  reduce  economic
activity in the short run (an industrial facility shuts down)
and  in  the  long  run  (the decision  not  to  locate  a  new
industry  in  an  area  with  poor  power  quality).  Further,
blackouts  lower  utility  revenues because  no  power  is sold
during  a  blackout, and  poor electricity supply reduces the
power market.
Losses of a similar scale are found in many other
segments of  the developing  country utility  operation,  i.e.
transmission, distribution, administration and billing.  In
particular,  poor  planning  for the transmission/distribution
system  and  poor  billing  procedures  produce  truly  awesome
losses in utility revenues.
For example, in Nigeria the gross revenues of the
Nigerian Electric Power Authority  (NEPA) are US$127 million
per year.  These revenues are derived from only 60% of the
electricity that NEPA produces, because total system losses
(technical and non-technical) are 40%.  Thus, in Nigeria, a
reduction of one percent in system losses is worth over US$2
million per year to the utility.10
The poor efficiency of developing country utilities
creates potentially profitable market opportunities for firms
that can help improve utility performance.  The market is not
only  large,  it  is growing  --  about  $50  billion  is  spent  on
new  developing  country power  systems each  year  and  annual
average developing country load growth is 7%. 1
8.  J. Krasnodebski & M.S. Grover, "Life Cycle Costs in
Planning  and  Designing  for  Availability,"  World  Energy
Conference, Rome, Italy, 28-31 October, 1985.
9.  P.C. Warner, H. Langner, "High Availability in Steam
Generator/Turbine  Units,"  World  Energy  Conference,  Rome,
Italy, 28-31 October, 1985.
10.  World Bank Report No. 6923-UNI, p,24 and annex 1-2.
11.  Christopher  Flavin, "Electricity for a Developing
World: New Directions," Worldwatch Paper 70, January 1986.5
Many architectural and engineering firms and a few
utilities  are  pursuing  this  market.  However,  the
international debt situation and limited foreign aid prevents
many developing country power authorities from acquiring  .. he
foreig-a  exchange needed to improve utility efficiency levels
by hiring expatriate consultants under a traditional fee-for-
services arrangement.  Furthermore, as indicated above, even
if  the  capital  is  available  from  concessional  lenders  or
other  sources,  many  effiL  icy problems  are  fundamentally
institutional  --  valid  r# :ommendations are  ignored,  and
expatriate  personnel  eit  cr  fail  to  train  indigenous
personnel or the personnel that are trained leave 'he utility
for the private sector.
In  short,  two  problems  must  be  solved.  First,
developing  country  utilities  must  gain  gvuater  access  to
foreign exchange  in  a  manner  that  allows  them  to  attract
private  contractors  interested  in  improving  utility
efficiency.  Second,  institutional  barriers  to  efficiency
must be removed or modified.
The  thesis  of  this  paper  is  that  performance
contracts can be used to solve the second problem.
B. grivate Sector Performance Contractinc.
Energy  performance  contracts  executed by  private
sector firms are generally structured as follows:
(1) A contractor provides a client  (usually a  facility
owner) with an engineering report.  If the client agrees
to  install  the  items  recommended  by  the  contractor,
there  is no  immediate charge  for the report.  If for
some reason  the client decides not to go through with
the  program,  the  client  pays  the  contractor  for  the
report.
(2)  Based  on  the  engineering  that  is  provided,  the
contractor  and  the  client  agree,  through  contract
negotiations,  to  the  implementation  of  improved
operating procedures  (including training to be provided
by the contractor) and the installation of energy saving
devices.
(3) The procedures are implemented and the devices are
installed by the contractor, again at no immediate cost
to.the client.
(4) The contractor's compensation is in some manner tied
to the  financial benefit that the contractor's efforts
helped to generate.6
This basic structure can take a number of different
forms,  with  the  greatest  distinction  being  the  manner  in
which compennation is tied to performance.  The most common
energy  performance  contracts  are  shared  savings,  pay  from
savings, guaranteed savings, and micro-utility arrangements.
Each  of  the  most  typical  energy  performance
contracts  is  described  below:
1.  Shared  Savings.  Under  a  "shared  savings"
contract  an  energy  performance  contractor  provides  energy
efficiency  services  anc  equipment  (the  equipment  can  be
supplied  by  a  lender or  lease company affiliated with  the
contractor),  in  exchange  for  a  share  of  the  energy  cost
savings or increased revenues that are generated.  Under this
arrangement, the risks of non-performance and the benefits of
over-performance shift almost totally from the facility owner
to the contractor.
For  example,  assume  a  facility  has  a  need  for
$1,000,000 in rehabilitation improvements that is expected to
decrease  the  facility's  energy  and  operating  costs  by
$500,000 per year.  An energy service company could propose
to  design,  install  and  maintain  these  improvements  in
excharnge  for one-half of the increased savings for a period
of seven years, or an estimated $1,750,000 over the period of
the contract.  The contractor can lose money  if the savings
do not increase as much as expected.  On the other hand, if
savings  increase  wore  than  expected,  the  contractor  would
make more than the estimated fee.
2.  Pay-from-savings.  A  "pay-from-savings"
arrangement  is  similar  to  a  shared  savings  arrangement,
except that the maximum payment is fixed, with the condition
that  the  payments  will  never  exceed  the  increased  savings
that are generated.  Like a shared savings contract, a pay-
from-savings arrangement limits the exposure of the facility
owner to the increased savings that are generated.  However,
pay-from-savings  limits the  contractor's downside  risk  (by
giving the contractor 100% of the increased savings until the
maximum  fee  amount  is  reached)  while  also  limiting  the
contractor's upside potential.
Using  same  hypothetical  example,  the  contractor
could  agree  to  provide the  $1,000,000 improvements in
exchange for an annual maximum fee of $250,000 per year for
five years.  If the facility owner's savings increase by only
$100,000  per year,  the contractor  would  be paid this  amount.
However, if the increase in savings is $750,000 per year, the
contractor  would  receive  no more  than  the  maximum  payment
under the contract ($250,000).7
3.  Guaranteed  Performance.  Under  a  "guaranteed
savings"  plan,  an energy  performance  contractor provides  a
guarantee  that  a  certain  level  of  performance  will  be
achieved.  Under this type of arrangement the contractor can
provide the  financing, take  over the responsibility to pay
the facility's energy expenses, and bill the facility owner
for a percentage of the facility's prior energy costs.  The
contractor's  gross  revenues are the difference  between the
amount  paid to  it by the facility owner and the amount the
contractor pays to the utility/energy supplier.
For  example,  if  the  annual  energy  costs  of  the
facility had been $1 million per year, the contractor could
agree to pay the energy costs of the facility and install its
equipment  in  exchange  for  90%  of  this  amount  from  the
facility owner each year for a period of ten years.  If the
contractor can lower the facility's energy bills to $700,000
per year, the  contractor pays out this amount  and receives
$900,000, for gross revenues of $200,000 per year.
Under  another  form  of  guaranteed  savings,  the
facility owner borrows the money from a bank or other lender.
Although  the  money  is borrowed by the  facility owner,  the
contractor guarantees that the increased savings will be more
than  sufficient  to pay  the  debt service on  the  loan.  By
providing the contractor with its payment at the beginning of
the  contract  (at the  completion  of  the  installation), the
facility owner  lowers the contractor's finance costs  (these
lower  costs  should  be passed  on the  facility owner)  while
also  affording  the  facility  owner  the  abiLity  to  take
advantage  of  potential  financing  advantages  uniquely
available to it, e.g. concessional lending. 12
For  example, the  facility owner  could borrow  the
$1,000,000  for  a  five year  period with  annual  payments  of
$225,000 per year.  The contractor could agree to guarantee
the  facility owner that  its increase in savings will be at
least  $225,000  per  year.  At  the  completion  of  the
installation, the contractor receives the $1,000,000 for its
work.  If  the  savings  are  $250,000  or  more  each  year,
everyone is satisfied.  However, if the first year's savings
are only $150,000, then the contractor would pay $100,000 to
the  facility owner  (the difference between the increase in
savings and the guaranteed amount).
12.  In  the U.S.,  guaranteed savings is popular with
state and  local governments because interest paid by these
entities  are  not  subject  to  federal  income  tax.  The
guarantee savings approach allows government clients to enter
into performance contracts using low cost government debt.8
4.  Micro-Utility.  A  "micro-utility"  approach
works for thore energy investments  that  can be  directly
metered.  Under  this  approach, the  contractor installs
equipment (usually  generating equipment)  and contracts to
sell  the  output to  the  facility owner for  a  stipulated
amount.  The example set forth  above  cannot  easily  fit into
this model, because most energy savings devices caninot  be
directly  metered.
These four basic approaches  to energy  performance
contracting  can be combined  or altered  to meet a variety  of
needs and  circumstances.  Further, each type of  payment
scheme can be structured  into a number of different  legal
forms, including various combinations  of  leases, service
contra,cts,  installment  contracts,  insurance  policies,  bonds,
etc.  The appropriate  payment  scheme  and legal  structure  -ust
be determined  by the facility  owner  and the contractor  r
case-  y-case  basis.
An  energy  performance  contract  can  provide
significant  benefits for the owner of the facility.  Most
importaritly  for many owners,  there is no need for "up-front"
capital  expenditures. Also, there is limited  risk, because
there  are  no  payments due  unless there  are  measurable
performance improvements,  and  generally the  payments are
structured  to be less than the savings so that there is
always  a positive  cash  flow  for  the facility  owner. Further,
the energy performance  contractor  may be able to act more
quickly  and do a better  job  than  the facility  owner  could  do
for itself.
However,  there  are significant  costs  as well.  The
performance  contractor  will require a  profit commensurate
with its perceived  risk.  If risks  are  very  high,  the profit
margin  must likewise  be very  high.  To lower  those  risks (and
the required  return  tc the  contractor),  performance  contracts
usually include a provision  under  which the facility  owner
agrees  to operate  the facility  according  to the contractor's
specifications.  While contractual  operational  parameters
may limit  the contractor's  risk and  thus reduce  the required
profit margin, the  issue of  losing exclusive operational
control  is a significant  problem  for  many  facility  owners.
Administrative  costs  are  also  significant.
Performance  contracts  are  complex.  They  require a
substantial  amount of  effor  to negotiate, and  once the
contract is underway it may  be costly and  difficult to
accurately measure performance.  Further, even  after  a
successful  negotiation, enforcement of  the  obligations
created  by  the  agreement have  caused problems  for  a9
relatively  large  percentage  of  facility  owners  that  have
engaged in these arrangements.
For many goveriament  facility owners, the benefits
of an energy performance contract are greater than the costs.
Indeed, the popularity of performance contracting appears now
to be greater in the public than in the private sector in the
United  States.  The  reason  is principally that  the public
sector  is  more  risk  averse  and  less  motivated  by  profit
maximization  than  the  private  sector.  Since  performance
contracts  are characterized by  lower risk for the  facility
owner, performance coatracting clearly appeals to government
facility owners on this basis.
Cogeneration and small power production facilities
are frequently installed under contracts that both limit the
risk of the facility owner and reward the contractor for good
performance.  Performance contracting has also been used in
large  industrial  applications.  However,  performance
contracts have been used most often to install energy saving
devices in commercial buildings.
C.  Government/Utility Performance Contracts.
Many  observers  complain  that  developing  country
utility  managers  cannot  improve the  efficiency  of  utility
operations because of controls placed upon the utility by the
central  government.  They  argue  that  if the  controls  are
lifted, performance would improve.
For  example, a major  problem  for many  developing
country  utilities  is  unscheduled  outages.  These  are  more
frequent  than  "optimum"  usually  because  the  utility  has
postponed scheduled preventive maintenance.  Unfortunately,
the decision to postpone a  scheduled outage  is sometimes a
political  rather  than  a  technical  or  economic  decision.
Further, unscheduled outages are longer than necessary due to
a  lack  of  critical spare  parts and  poorly equipped  repair
shops.  Again,  the decision to short-change maintenance  in
favor of new, more visible  (and more popular) projects is a
political decision with adverse economic consequences.
Equally  important,  many  developing  country
utilities have problems  in training and retaining qualified
maintenance  personnel,  due  largely  to  civil  service
regulations13 and  higher  pay  in the private  sector.14 As
11  . David  Jhirad,  Pirooz  Sharafi,  Ed  Hillsman,
"Innovative  Approaches  to  Electric  Power  Delivery  in
Developing  Countries,"  Asia  and Near East Workshop, Asian10
long  as  the  utility  is  run  as  just  another  part  of  the
government bureaucracy, these regulations and pay limitations
will  inhibit  significant  improvement  in  management
performance.  Poor management  is not surprising when upper
management  are  politically  appointed  (frequently  with  no
regard  for  professional  competence),  and  when  management
decisions are politically motivated.
Many believe that if these political influences are
removed  (also called  "privatizing" or "commercializing" the
utility),  improved utility performance can be achieved with
little capital outlay.  Unfortunately, privatizing developing
country utility operatLons is extraordinarily difficult.  For
understandable reasons, central governments are reluctant to
relinquish  control of what  is frequently the most capital-
intensive segment in the economy.  However, for reasons that
are  just  as  understandable,  many  international  lending
institutions are beginning to insist on management reforms as
a  conditiop  to  providing  loans  for  developing  country
utilities.
These management reforms can be instituted through
a  government/utility  performance  contract.  Since  utility
performance can be quantified in a relatively straightforward
fashion, a government/utility performance contract conditions
the  granting  of  management  freedom  with  measurable
improvements in utility operations.
A  government/utility  performance  contract  could
work as follows:
(1) The  central  government  agrees  to  exempt  the
electric utility from one or more  of the constraints under
which the utility has previously operated, e.g. civil service
regulations,  procurement  regulations,  interference  with
maintenance  decisions  from  political  appointees,  timely
payment of utility bills b)y  goveLnment agencies, etc.
(2)  The  electric  utility  agrees  to  improve
performance  according  to  some  measurable  criteria,  e.g.
availability  factor,  employees  per  MW,  losses  due  to
technical and non-technical factors, etc.
(3)  If the electric utility meets its goals, the
central  government  continues  and  expands  the  operational
freedom of action of the utility.  However, if the goals are
Institute  of  Technology,  Bangkok,  Thailand,  September  29-
October 3, 1986.
14.  Id., Note 11.11
not met,  the  freedoms that were  previously granted can be
withdrawn.
The  performance  contract  provides  the  utility  a
meacurable basis upon which  it can extract freedom from the
central government on a gradual basis.  It also provides the
central government with the power to reimpose controls unless
certain goals are met.  This freedom and the threat of losing
it  has  the  potential  to  provide  important  non-monetary
incentives to  utility management  to  achieve the  goals  set
forth in the performance contract.
Most of the problems associated with private sector
energy  performance  contracts  will  also  be  present  in  a
government/utility  performance  contracts.  The  central
government and the utility will find it difficult to estimate
reasonable savings goals and investment needs and to measure
performance  improvements.  In  addition  to  these  problems,
utility and government officials will face the difficulty of
negotiating  issues  of  extreme  sensitivity,  e.g.  changing
working conditions for unionized workers.  Further, enforcing
a performance contract against the central government may be
impossible, even  if the negotiated performance  targets are
met.  15
Despite  these  difficulties,  commercialization  of
developing  country  utilities  is  regarded  by  many  as  a
necessary  precondition  to  improving  their  efficiency.  A
government/utility performance contract  is one way  to meet
this precondition in a manner that may be more acceptable to
the  central  government.  Further,  as  discussed  below,
operational flexibility for the utility will be a reauirement
of any private sector  firm that is interested in providing
energy services and equipment to a developing country utility
under a performance contract.
D. Utility Twinning.
"Utility twinning" is based on the concept that a
developing  country  utility  can  gain  useful  training  from
another, "consulting,"  utility.  This training can take place
at the facilities of the developing country utility or at the
facilities of  the consulting utility.  "Twinning" has been
used in a number of countries, with mixed results.  Despite
these mixed  results, the  twinning concept could  be coupled
15.  A central government that decides that autonomy for
the utility is not in the national interest is unlikely to be
dissuaded  by  a  contract  from  reasserting  control,
particularly  if  the  contract  was  executed  by  a  previous  government.12
with  the  performance  contract  concepts  discussed  above,
particuLarly for the private sector electric utilities that
dominate the United States.
The  author  has  discussed  the  performance
contract/utility  twinning  concept  with  a  number  of  U.S.
utilities.16 More  than  a  few  expressed  an  interest  in
establishing a partnership with a developing country utility
through  a  long-term performance contract.  There  are three
principal reasons for this interest:
o  many  U.S.  utilities  have  excess  engineering
capabilities and investment capital due to domestic cut-backs
in power plant construction;
o  many  U.S.  utilities  have  non-regulated
subsidiaries  that  are  already  involved  (domestically)  in
performance  contracting,  others  have  non-regulated
subsidiaries that are involved in international marketing of
consulting  services,  and  both  kinds  of  subsidiaries  are
seeking new markets; and
o  utilities  *are experienced  in  making  equity
investments.
There  are  obvious  advantages  in  establishing  a
mutually  advantageous  long-term  relationship  between  an
efficiently  run,  capital  rich  utility  and  a  poorly  run,
capital short utility.  As described in the next section, it
may be possible to structure this relationship as an energy
performance  contract  in  tandem  with  a  central
government/utility performance contract.
III. Barriers to Performance Contracting.
Private sector  energy performance contracting has
not yet been used to improve a developing country utility's
level of efficiency.  One reason for this is the relatively
short  history  of  private  sector  energy  performance
contracting. 17 However, there are two fundamental problems
that  must  be  overcome  before  private  sector  energy
16.  Research by Philip Yates for USAID, October, 1986.
17.  Private sector energy performance contracting has
been  used  for  decades  in  France  on  a  small  scale  for
residential apartment buildings.  In 1978, the business took
off  in  the  U.S.  as  a  result  of  favorable  tax  treatment.
Thus,  large scale  energy performance contracts have  only a
ten-year history.'3
performance  contracts  can  be  used  to  improve  the  energy
efficiency of developing country utilities.
These  problems  are:  (1)  the  energy  performance
contractor  needs to control the factors that  influence the
performance of the utility; and  (2) most developing country
utilities do not have the foreign exchange available to allow
foreign contractors and investors to remove their profits in
hard currency.  The first of these problems can be dealt with
(at least  in  part)  through  the  mechanism  of  the  central
government/utility  performance  contract.  The  second  may
require concessional lending from bilateral and multilateral
agencies.
A.  Operational Control.
A basic tenet of energy performance contracting is
that the contractor must have control over the factors that
govern the quantifiable measure of performance.  For example,
assume a developing country utility contracts with an energy
performance  contractor to provide training, pay bonuses for
exemplary employees, spare parts, and management assistance
in  exchange  for  10%  of  the  increased  revenues  that  are
produced  for  the  utility  through  improved  power  plant
availability.  Assume  also that, as part  of its management
assistance, the contractor develops a preventive maintenance
schedule  for  the plant.  Because the contractor  stands to
lose  its  investment  (in the  training,  pay  bonuses,  spare
parts, and management studies) if the maintenance schedule is
not  followed,  the  contractor  is  certain  to  insist,  as  a
condition to making the investment,  that the utility abide by
the contractor's maintenance schedule.
Likewise, the control of utility operations is the
key  issue  addressed  by  the  central  government/utility
performance  contract concept discussed above.  However,  if
the utility is not currently staffed with competent managers,
simply providing greater power to management is unlikely to
produce  a  significant  short-term  improvement  in  utility
operations.  Indeed,  if  the  developing  country  utility's
management is truly incompetent, providing them with greater
operational  freedom  could  degrade  short-term  performance.
Accordingly,  a  developing  country  utility  that  lacks
management  skills  needs  to  be  able  to  acquire  management
expertise in order to meet its performance obligations to the
government.
Clearly,  the  combination  of  a  government/utility
performance  contract  and  a  utility/contractor  energy
performance  contract  has  the  potential  for  a  synergistic
effect.  The  first contract provides the  flexibility needed14
for good management  decisions, and the second provides the
skills needed to make the freedoms pay off.  Further, since
the contracts are structured so that neither the utility nor
the  energy  performance  contractor  receives  its  "payoff"
(freedom, higher  pay  and  greater  status  for  the  utility
managers;  profits  for  the  contractor)  in  the  absence  of
performance,  a  program  structured  around  a  combination  of
these two performance contracts may be politically acceptable
to the central government.15
h.  Foreian Exchange.
Even if an energy performance contractor was able
to  secure  absolute  control  over  the  operations  of  a
developing country utility plant, the contractor would not be
interested in investing in improving the plant's efficiency
unless the contractor's profits can be expatriated from the
country.  Unfortunately,  the  countries  with  the  greatest
utility efficiency problems usually have such limited foreign
exchange  that  there  is  not  enough  to  pay  expatriate
contractors or investors, regardless of the profitability of
their efforts.
This  is true even  if the savings produced by the
energy  performance  contractor  are  savings  in  foreign
exchange.  For  example,  many  developing  country utilities
fue. utility boilers with  imported oil, which  is purchased
with foreign exchange.  An energy performance contract could
be structured between the utility and an expatriate firm to
improve the efficiency of the utility's operation and thus
reduce the country's imports of oil.  However, if other, more
senior creditors are already "in line" for payments from the
country's  limited foreign exchange reserves, there will  be
none left for the energy performance contractor.
Accordingly,  a  private  sector  energy  performance
contract can work for most developing country utilities only
if the contract is in some manner connected with one of the
cou..try's senior  creditors,  i.e.  one  of  the  concessional
lending  institutions.
However,  an  energy  performance  contract  requires
periodic payments to the contractor based on the measure of
performance for each period of the contract, e.g. 50% of the
savings each  year  for five years.  Thus,  for concessional
lending to be used in conjunction  with the energy performance
contract concept, the  lender must  be willing to  leave the
"account  open"  for  the  period  of  the  contract,  or  to
otherwise  provide  for  foreign  exchange  payments  to  the
contractor for each year of a relatively long-term contract.
Thus,  energy performance  contracting will  not only require
reforms  in  the  developing  country utilities;  it  may  also
require reforms in international lending practices (which do
not  currently  allow  this  kind  of  long-term  payment
structure).16
IV.  A Model Enercrv  Performance Contract Usina Concessional
Lending,
No developing country utility has yet entered into
an  energy  performance  contract  in  conjunction  with  a
government/utility  performance  contract.  Despite  the  appeal
of this concept on a theoretical basis, it will remain only a
theory until it is attempted in some country.  The following
describes  how  the  concept  could  be  pilot  tested  by  an
international lending institution.
Step One: The Lender Determines to Test the ConceDt.
An  international  concessional  lender  decides  to
condition its next energy sector loan to a developing country
utility on the structural reform of the utility.  The long-
term goal of this restructuring is to improve the quality of
the i'ility's management,  so that the utility will  operate
more s-fficiently.  Specific needs identified by the  lender
are  better  training,  higher  status and higher pay  for all
levels  of  the  utility's  management,  independence  from
political  control, and  relief  from stultifying  procurement
regulations.  Also  needed  are  higher  tariffs  and  for
government agencies to pay their power bills.
The  lender  decides  that  the  utility  management
wants greater freedom from the central government, and will
enthusiastically support the testing of the synergy between
the  private  sector  energy  performance  contract  and  the
government/utility performance contract.  Accordingly, the
lender modifies its lending procedures to meet the needs of
an energy performance contract procurement.
In effect, the lender creates an escrow account to
receive the loan proceeds.  The escrow funds will be drawn
down  for disbursement to the contractor at the end of each
year (yearly  outlays will necessary vary, because performance
will  vary  from year  to year).  The  escrow must  remain  in
place for the duration of the contract, which is likely to be
from five to ten years.
SteR Two:  The Government/Utility  Performance Contract.
The  utility  and  the  central  government  (under
pressure  from  the  lender)  negotiate  a  government/utility
performance contract.  The contract has a number of stages,
withi  a performance target associated with each stage.
For example, the  first  stage could  call  for  the
lifting  of  central  government  control  over  personnel,17
procurement  and  maintenance  decisions.  The  utility's
performance  target  (over  some  time  period)  could  be  to
improve  system  losses  by,  say,  5%,  and  to  increase
productivity by some specific measure, e.g. reduce the ratio
of employees to MW produced by 5%.  If these targets are met,
the second  stage would  call for the utility to be provided
with  the  authority  to  increase tariffs  according  to  some
formula based on its cost of providing service.  Since this
latter  reform  is  financial  rather  than  operational,  the
performance  goal  should  be  in measurable  financial terms,
e.g. amount of government subsidy per MW produced.
Obviously, the  reforms needed  and the performance
improvements  that  can  be  expected  to  result  from  these
reforms will vary from utility to utility.
SteR Three: Request for PrORosal.
Once the government/utility perfoxmance contract is
negotiated, the utility knows what freedoms it has, and what
performance targets it must meet.  The utility publishes a
'Request  for  Proposals"  (RFP)  to  select  a  contractor  to
-_rove  the  efficiency  of  the  utility  under  an  energy
pe-rformance contract.  The  RFP  states  the  performance
improvement that  is deemed  achievable, and the time period
over  which  that  goal  should  be  achieved.  The  RFP  is
structured in two steps: (1) a preliminary analysis; and (2)
an energy performance contract.
The first step calls for the contractor to provide
a  preliminary  engineering  analysis  for  the  utility.  The
contractor will be asked to identify operational improvements
that should be undertaken by the utility.  Included in these
tasks will be the work elements the utility identified in the
RFP, plus others that the contractor believes are important.
Essentially, the  contractor  is asked  in the  first step to
specify its recommendation for the scope of work under the
second  step  --  the  energy  performance  contract.  The
preliminary analysis contract will be for a relatively short
time period, e.g. three to six months.
The  second  step  of  the  procurement  is  the
negotiation  of  the  long-term  energy  performance  contract
between  the  utility  and  the  contractor.  Only  if  the
negotiations  'Te successful  will  the  contractor  begin  to
implement  the  recommendations  it  made  in  the  preliminary
analysis.
The  RFP  specifies the  compensation mechanism  for
the  contractor: the  contractor's costs  are guaranteed,  but
its  profits  are  tied  to  performance  improvements.  This18
assures  the  contractor  that  its  participation  with  the
utility  will  not  lose  money.  This  limitation  on  the
contractor's  risk  is  suggested because  some  limitation  on
risk will almost certainly be required until contractors gain
the confidence that they can make money improving developing
country utility efficiency using the performance contracting
concept.
A basic rule of economics is at play:  the higher
the risk on the contractor, the higher the return that will
be  required to  induce a contractor to take that risk.  The
application of this rule means that the profits that will be
demanded under an energy performance contract (even with the
risk limitation feature suggested here) are higher than the
profits  that  would  be  demanded  under  a  straight  fee-for-
service  contract.  Later,  if  performance  contracting  for
developing country utilities proves successful, a developing
country  utility  may  be  able  to  negotiate  a  "pure"  energy
performance  contract,  such  as  a  shared  savings  contract,
which  ties  all of  the contractor's compensation  (return of
investment capital plus profits) to performance improvements.
Of  course, the  contractor's profit  expectations under  this
"pure"  contract  will  have  tc  be  higher  than  under  the
compensation scheme suggested here.
Under the RFP's compensation scheme, the contractor
bills the utility for two items (all bills will be paid from
the  escrow  account  set  up  by  the  lender).  First,  the
contractor  periodically sends  "cost bills",  to recover  its
expenses as  those expenses  are incurred.  Cost bills  are
reviewed  and  paid  just  as  normal  fee-for-service  bills.
Second, the contractor sends "performance bills" at periodic
intervals.  Performance  bills  are  reviewed  to  determine
whether or not the contractor's bills match the performance
levels actually achieved.
While  the  RFP  states  an  upper  limit  for  all
payments to the contractor under the contract, the RFP does
not  allocate  those  costs  between  "cost"  payments  and
"pprformance"  payments.  The  RFP  will  allow  the  contractor
and  the  utility  to  negotiate  a  split  between  the  available
funds between contractor costs and performance-based profits.
Step Four:  Contractor Selection.
Under  traditional  procedures,  the  government
dictates the terms of the contract, and awards that contract
to  the  firm that presents  the  "lowest responsible bid"  to
perform  the  contract.  However,  in the context of energy
performance  contracting, there  are two basic  problems with
traditional bid procedures.19
The  first  is that  an energy  performance  contract
cannot be executed until After the contractor has completed a
preliminary  analysis  that  provides  to  the  contractor  an
understanding  of  what  is  needed  to  achieve  a  given
improvement  in perforimnce.  This  understanding  cannot  be
gained  by  reading the  RFP.  In each case,  the  contractor
needs to make this evaluation on its own.  Since the utility
cannot expect each prospective bidder to make this evaluation
at  its  cost  in anticipation of  winning  the  bid,  it makes
sense for the utility to select the winning bidder, allow the
winner to perform a preliminary analysis, and begin contract
negotiations upon the completion of the analysis.
The second problem with "lowest responsible bidder"
procedures  is the difficulty  in producing cost numbers that
will allow meaningful comparisons.  More often than not when
dealing with  energy  efficiency,  the lowest  "first cost"  is
not ths lowest "life-cycle t.ost." Choosing the lowest first
cost  energy  performance  contractor may  be a mistake, while
relying on  a  contractor's  savings projections  for a  life-
cycle cost analysis may also be a mistake.  Further, for many
energy  performance  contracts  there  are no  fixed cost.  If
contractor X bids "50% of savings" and contractor Y bids "40%
of savings," can it be said that contractor Y has the lowest
bid?  Contractor Y will  not be the low bid  if the savings
that can be achieved by contractor X are 20% more than the
savings  that  can  be  achieved  by  contractor  Y.  And,  of
course, there  is no way to tell from the bid numbers which
contractor is most likely to achieve the greatest savings.
Conversely,  an  examination  of  gualifications  may
provide a  good  indication of the  firm that  it is the most
likely  to  achieve the  best  performance.  Accordingly, the
appropriate criteria is "most qualified bidder" rather than
"lowest  responsible  bidder."  Qualification  criteria  can
include  a  host  of  specific  qualifications,  e.g.  native
language  capabilities,  financial  strength,  professional
expertise, experience in improving the efficiency of similar
facilities,  etc.  Of  course,  "qualifications"  are  more
subjective than  "lowest bid," which  is why the procurement
flexibility provided to the utility by the government/utility
performance contract will be useful  in selecting the energy
performance contractor.
Steo Five:  Preliminary Analysis Contract.
Once  the utility  determines that a  contractor  is
the "best qualified," the utility and the contractor execute
a  contract  under  which  the  contractor  can  conduct  a
"preliminary analysis."20
The contractor sends its cost will for preliminary
analysis as soon as the analysis is complete.  However, there
is  no  immediate opportunity  for the  contractor  to  make  a
profit  on  the  preliminary  analys'is.  A  profit  on  the
preliminary analysis will only be possible if the contractor
and the utility execute an energy performance contract and if
the contractor improves the utility's performance under the
contract.
Step Six:  Neaotiatina the Details.
Upon  the  completion of  the  preliminary  analysis,
the parties will be ready to negotiate an energy performance
contract.
The negotiations could immediately fail because the
contractor concludes that the utility's performance cannot be
improved  for  the  amount  specified  in  the  RFP.  (If  the
contractor needs a particular  profit to participate, and
the direct costs  of the program will exhaust all or almost
all  of  the  funds  available  from  the  lender,  then  the
contractor will not be interested in proceeding.)  If this is
the case, then the utility may determine that its facilities
are not suitable for the energy performance contract concept,
and terminate the program.
Alternatively, negotiations could fail because the
utility  and  the  contractor cannot  agree  upon the  scope  of
work,  the  issues  of  operational  control,  the  cost/profit
split  of  the  available  funds,  or  upon  the  way  that
performance will be measured.  If one of these issues causes
negotiations to break down, the utility may find it desirable
to  terminate  its  relationship  with  the  winning  bidder,
contact  the  second  best  qualified  bidder  and  execute  a
contract  with  that  contractor  to  provide  an  independent
review of the preliminary analysis,l1 and begin negotiations
anew.
A  successful negotiation of an energy performance
contract  is dependent upon  the clear understanding of both
18.  Although  each energy performance  contractor will
insist that only it can perform the engineering upon which it
performance  contracts  will  be  based,  the  cost  of  this
engineering will be much lower  if another firm has  already
performed the work.  The second firm then needs to do nothing
more than verify that the results are accurate.  Only if the
first job is inadequate will the second attempt be expensive.21
parties that  risk  allocation is the fundamental purpose of
the  contract.  In particular,  the  utility must  understand
that the potential profits that will  flow to the contractor
if the performance targets are met must be higher  (perhaps
much higher) than the profits the contractor would make on a
straight  fee-for-services  contract.  Otherwise,  the
contractor  will  have  no  incentive  to  take  the  risk  of
entering  into  a  contract  that  potentially will  provide no
profits.  Conversely, the contractor must understand that its
opportunity  for  higher  profits must  in  fact be  offset  by
higher  risks;  there  is  no  reason  for  the  utility  to  pay
higher  than  normal  profits  unless  the  contractor  assumes
greater than  normal risks.  The relationship between risks
and  rewards  is  fundamental  to  all  aspect  of  an  energy
performance contract.
For  example, there  is a  clear connection  between
the profit formula (how improvements in performance relate to
contractor profits) and the operational assurances that the
contractor receives.  If the contractor does not receive the
control it needs  for the profit  formula it proposes in the
negotiations  (e.g. 10% of the improved revenues that accrue
to the utility as a result of its services), it may live with
less control with a more  generous formula (e.g. 20% of the
revenues).  Conversely,  if  the  utility  believes  that  the
contractor's profit formula is excessive, the contractor may
insist  on  greater  operational  control  than  originally
proposed in exchange for a lowering of the profit formula.
In addition to the fundamental issues of risk and
reward, there are a number of other contractual issues that
will  be  the  subject of the  negotions.  However,  only  the
issues  related  to  the  rieasurement  of  performance  will  be
addressed here.
An  energy  performance  contract  must  include  a
"baseline formula" under which  performarce improvements can
be  measured.  In  effect,  the  baseline  formula  is
hypothetical;  it  estimates  what  the  performance  of  the
facility would have  been  if the performance contractor had
not provided its services.  The facility owner does not want
to pay for performance that would have been achieved without
the  intervention of the performance  contractor.  Likewise,
the  performance  contractor does  not  want  to  lose  revenues
through actions over which  it has  no cont.ol.  A  baseline
formula should be fair and simple, and yet be flexible enough
to deal with  the myriad  of  factors that can affect energy
performance.
Utility  facilities  change  over  time,  with  or
without a performance contractor in the picture.  Equipment
is added or removed; refurbishing takes place; loads change;22
fuel quality changes.  The baseline formula should be able to
predict how these changes wguld have affected the performance
of the facility if  there had been no program implemented by
the performance contractor.
A  baseline  formula requires an  adequate  database
and a  methodology  for manipulating the data.  The required
data  falls  into  three  general  categories:  historical
performance,  facility  characteristic  variables,  and  other
variables.
The  starting  point  is  the  facility's  past
performance.  The  main  consideration  in  negotiations  is
whether there are anomalies or trends in the data.  If there
are, the  "raw" data must be adjusted to compensate for the
anomaly or trend.  For example, if the utility has installed
performance-enhancing equipment shortly before entering into
an energy performance contract, the baseline formula should
not be based on raw historical data.  The new equipment will
already  be  influencing the  facility's performance.  Unless
the  baseline  is adjusted for this, the  contractor will  be
paid for savings that would have occurred regardless of its
efforts.  In this situation a baseline formula can still be
negotiated, but it must be based upon theoretical (and lower)
performance  figures  than  the  raw  numbers.  In  some
situations,  the  raw numbers are  so  erratic  (sometimo.s  for
reasons that are not readily apparent) that a good baseline
is  impossible  to  generate  and  performancc  contracting  is
simply inappropriate.
The  second  point  of  negotiation  involves  the
characteristics  of  the  facility.  It  is  important  to
inventory all  significant equipment  in the facility and to
list them in the contract, because a chanae in this equipment
will  have  an  impact on energy performance.  Likewise, the
facility's  general  characteristics must  be  identified,  so
that any refurbishing can be quantified and its energy impact
computed.
Finally,  the  other  known  variables  that  affect
performance must be accounted for.  For example, if a coal
fired  plant  is  the  subject  of  the  energy  performance
contract, the quality of the coal must be addressed in the
performance  formula.  If  coal  quality  goes  up  or  down,
performance and maintenance costs will be affected.  If this
factor  is  beyond  the  control  of  the  energy  performance
contractor,  the  baseline  formula  should  be  able  to  make
adjustments for changes in coal quality.
After agreement is reached on the appropriate data
to  consider,  agreement  must  then  be  reached  on  how  to
manipulate that data.  It is beyond the scope of this paper23
to delve into the intricacies  of the different methodologies.
However, it is extremely important to recognize that unknown
factors can cause variations  in performance.  For example,
efficiency over time is rarely steady; even factoring in all
known  variables, performance  can vary  for unknown  reasons.
Consequently,  it  can  be  expected  that  in  some  periods
performance  improvement may  be measured without any  effort
from anyone.  To eliminate the chance of paying for random
performance  improvements,  the  contract  should  require  a
certain minimum level of performance improvements  before any
payment is due.
Absolute baseline accuracy is a laudable goal, but
almost  impossible  to  achieve.  What  is  achievable  is
fairness.  There  should  be  an  equal  probability  that  the
measured  improvement  is higher  or  lower than  the  "actual"
improvement.  Under a fair baseline formula it is likely that
one  or  the  other  party  may  come  out  a  little  ahead  but
neither party will know which is the winner.  In a successful
project, neither will care.
Step Seven: X.  -lementing  the Contract.
One  of  the  attractive  features  of  an  energy
performance contract is that the success or  failure of the
contract is readily apparent --  performance either  improves
or  it  does  not.  Clearly,  the  success  of  an  energy
performance contract between a developing country utility and
a private sector contractor will depend on the quality of the
contractor and the willingness of the utility to follow the
contractor's suggested changes.
However, an energy performance contract is a long-
term  undertaking.  It  is  extraordinarily  difficult  to
consider in a contract all the things that may turn out to be
important in several years.  Accordingly, success also will
depend  on  the  reasonableness  of  each  of  the  parties,  and
their  willingness to  flexibly respond to unforseen events.
Further, because the contract is long-term, it may be several
years before an energy performance contract can be considered
to be a success or a failure.
V. Conclusion.
The  efficiency  problems  of  developing  country
utilities  are  enormous  and  not  easily  solved.  Energy
performance  contracting  can  help  solve  some  of  the
institutional  problems  of  the  utilities  of  developing
countries  by  providing  a  mechanism  through  which
institutional reforms can be implemented.24
During  the current  developing  country  debt crisis,
international  lenders  and aid institutions  may wish to focus
their aid to improve  utility  efficiency  through  performance
cont;cacts. If performance  contracting  can be tested and
developed  with  the assistance  of subsidies  during  the  present
period, unsubsidized  performance  contracting  will be more
likely to  be  used  by  private investors when  developing
countries  have  better  access  to foreign  exchange.- 25  - APPENDIX
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ENERGY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREENENT, made  and entered Into this  ....  day of  ...........  19____, shatl be
the  agreed  basis  of  performing  the  following  work  by  and  between
__  __ __  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Owner,  and…
hereinefter referred to as the Contractor.
The Owner has determined that a need exists to secure energy management equipment and
services for the purpose of reducing energy consumption at the following facility(s):
The Owner  is  authorized by  the  laws  of the State of  ----------  to enter  into this
Agreement, and
The Contractor  is authorized by the  laws of the State of  .........  to provide such
energy management equipment and services, and,
The Owner has requested the Contractor to provide for such energy management equipment
and services.
THEREFORE: It is agreed, in exchange for mutual consideration, as foLlows:
SECTION 1
DEFINITIONS
Unless otherwise stated, the terms defined in this Section have the meaning specified
for all purposes of this Agreement.
"Agreement"  meens  this  Agreement  and  any  amendment  or  supplements  including  the
Exhibits attached hereto.
KAgreement Term" means  the duratoc- of thlis  Agrement as provided in Section 9 of this
Agreement.
*Audit"  means  a  deta;led  energy  audit  of  a  facility  which  identifles  the  energy
conservation  measure  and  services  to  be  recommended  for  inclusion  in  the  energy
management agreement.
"Saseline" means the monthly baseline energy consumption of the facility as calculated
from historical energy use for all fuels and normalized monthly for weather.
"Contractor" means an entity functioning  as an energy service company (ESCo).
"Emergency" means any  sudden  or unforeseen situation that  requires immediate action
Including threats to life, safety and health.
"Energy Savings" means the reduction  in energy consumption during the current period
which is the difference between the baseline consumption and the current consumption
for all fuels.
"Energy  Cost  Savings"  means  energy  savings  in  kWh,  therms,  gallons,  tons,  etc.
multiplied times the current (or monthly average) unit price for that type of energy.
"Energy Service Company" means the company which provides services that  include, but
are not  limited to financing, design, installation, repair, maintenance, management,
technicel advice, and/or training for energy conservation project(s).
NEquipment"  means  the  personal  and/or  real  property  described  in  Exhibit  A,  any
amendments thereto, and any other energy conservation measures the parties agree upon.- 27  - APPENDIX
"Full Contract Amount" means the total amount to be reimbursed the Contractor for the
Equipment and Services provided under the conditions of the Agreement.
"Owner" means the State of  a-------------  and/or its ltwful successors or assigns.
"Services" means  those personal services provided  by  the Contractor  to fulfill the
requirements of this Agreement to include maintenance, monitoring, training and other
services as described in Exhibit F.
SECTION 2
COVENANTS OF AGREEMENT
The  Owner  covenants  that  it  is  a  duly  const'tuted  agency  of  the  State  of
and  is authorized by the laws of the State of  __  to enter
into .he transaction contemplated by this Agreement and to carry out its obligations.
The Owner  has been duly  authorized to execute and deliver this Agreement and agrees
that  it will  do  or  cause to be done  all things necessary  to preserve and  keep the
Agreement in full force and effect.
The owner further covenants that all procedures have been met and that the Owner has
complied  with  all  selection  requirements  where  necessary  and  by  due  notification
presented this Agreement for approval and adoption as a valid obligation on its part.
SECTION 3
ENERGY AUDIT
The  Contractor  shall  undertake  a  detailed  energy  audit  of  the  facility(s)  at  its
expense.  The Owner agrees to furnish the Contractor with any prior energy audits which
have been performed on the Owner's facility, current and historical energy consumption
for the facility, occupancy  information, a description of energy management practices
presently utilized and other information which may assist the Contractor in conducting
a detailed energy audit.
The owner further agrees to pay the Contractor a predetermined fee for the energy audit
if  the Owner  fails to enter  into an energy management agreement with the Contractor
through no fault of the Contractor.  Payment to the Contractor will be based upon the
reasonable value  of the equipment and services recommended to the Owner.  The Owner
wiLL  consider  such  things as effect  on  facility operation  and budget, maintenance,
environmental  constraints,  technical  feasibility  and  accuracy  of  computations  in
determining the appropriateness of  the Contractor's recommendations.  The Owner will
have no payment obligations under this Agreement in the event the audit shows an energy
consumption savings of less than ten percent (10X) annually or the Contractor is unable
to provide financing for the project(s).
The  energy audit  will  include an anelysis  and description  of the facility's energy
consuming equipment, a description of the current maintenance practices, recommended
energy  conservation  measures,  and  services  for  inclusion  in  the  energy  management
agreement, baseline energy consumption, energy savings, energy cost savings, equipment
description,  training  requirements,  construction  schedule,  payment  procedures,
guarantees, warranties and other items which the Contractor may identify in the audit.
SECTION 4
BASELINE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
The baseline of energy consumption for the facility(s) which will be used to determine




Modification of the facility beseline energy consumption mey be required to reflect any
planned  or  actual  material  changes  in the  facility(s), changes  in facility use  or
changes  in  energy  supplied  to  the  facility(s).  Such  changes  shell  include  the
following:- 28  - APPDMIK
a. A change In operating hours of the facility(s) or a change in the operating hours of
any energy consuming equipment.
b. A change In the occupancy rate or occupancy pattern of the facility(s).
c.  A  moterial  change  in a  structure  to  include building  remodeling,  additions  or
demotitions.
d. A change in the types of equipment used in the faOlity(s).
e. Any other conditIons which may affect or change annual energy use by five percent
t5S) or more, thereby requiring baseline modifications.
8aselfne modification mill  be accomplished through mutuat agreement by the Owner and
Contractor.  The Owner shalt deliver to the Contractor within ten days of receipt of
such information calculate a modified baseline and forward to the Owner a notice of the
proposed modification.  Such modification shall become effective within  ten days of
receipt by  the Owner unless disapproved by the Owner.  Ccst  to modify  the baseline
shalt be borne by  the Owner when  such modification is requested by  the Owner.  Any
disagreement on any proposed baseline modification shall be negotiated in good faith by
both parties.
SECTION 6
CALCULATION OF ENERGY SAVINGS
Total energy savings is the projected energy consumption (baseline consumption adjusted
for weather and occupancy) less the monitored energy consumption.  The procedures for
calculating energy consumption, energy savings and energy cost savings is presented in
Exhibit C, attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
SECTION 7
PAYMENT FOR EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES
Payment to the Contractor will be indexed to the energy cost savings resulting from the
implementation of energy conserving measures and services.  The Owner agrees to pay to
the Contractor as compensation for  its services an amount which shall not exceed the
amount of energy cost savings.  Such payments shall be made on a monthly basis and will
become due within thirty  days of receipt of the Contractor's invoice.  The terms of the
payment process are shown in Exhibit D.
Contractor invoicing and Owner payment shall be accomplished in the following manner:
a. The Owner will send to the Contractor copies of all energy bills for the facility
and copies of all other data required by Exhibit C within ten days after the receipt by
the Owner.
b. The Contractor shall calculate the energy consumption savings achieved by comparing
energy  consumption  for  the  current  month  with  consumption  during  the  equivalent
baseline month prescribed in Exhibit C.
c. The Contractor shall multiply the amount of saved energy by the unit cost (monthly
average) then  in effect for each type of energy which was consumed during the month.
The sum of  each typi of energy cost savings will be the total amount of energy cost
savings for that month.
d. The Contractor will prepare and send to the Owner a monthly invoice for the amount
of compensation as defined in Exhibit D.  The  invoice will set forth the amounts of
energy consumption savings, energy consumption cost savings and the
amount  due  the  Contractor.  The  Contractor will  attach  its  calculations with  the
invoice.
e.  Within  sixty  (60)  days  after  oach anniversary of  the  commencement date  of  the
Agreement, the Contractor wfil calculate the annual cost sevings or guaranteed minimum
energy coet savings whichever is  greater.- 29  - APPENDIX
SECTION 8
INDEPENDENT AUDIT
The  Owner  may,  at  Its  own  expense,  have  conducted  an  independent  audit  of  the
Contractor's energy savings calculations and b1llings.  Such audit, to be done by an
energy auditor, certified public accountant or other quaLified person agreed to by the
parties,  may  be  conducted  at  any  time  during  the  term  of  this  Agreement.
Irregularities in savings or payments that may arise from the audit will be resolved by
the provisions set forth in Exhibit NE.
SECTION  9
AGREEMENT TERN
The term of this Agreement shall begin on the date of the execution of this Agreement
and shall  run  continuously from  such date  until…-  The commencement
date  shall be the first date of the month after the month in which the Contractor has
substantialLy completed installation of the Equipment and such Equipment is operating
and producing an energy savings confirmed in writing by the Owner and the Contractor.
The Contractor mitl  deliver a written notice to the Owner  that it has substantially
completed the Equipment installation.
SECTION 10
EQUIPMENT ACCESS
The  Owner  shall  provide  mutually  satisfactory  reasonable  rent  free  space  to  the
Contractor for the  installation and operation of the Equipment and shall protect its
own  property.  The  Owner  shall  further  provide  access  to  its  facility  for  the
Contractor and its subcontractors during regular operating hours and such hours as may
be requested by the Contractor which are acceptable to the Owner.  The purpose of such
access shall be to install, adjust. inspect and/or maintain the Equipment and to make
any necessary emergency repairs.
SECTION 11
EQUIPNENT MAINTENANCE
The Contractor will provide for all necessary maintenance of the installed Equipment
unless maintenance responsibilities have been  transferred to the Owner through mutual
agreement.  The Contractor's maintenance responsibilities includes normal maintenance,
adjustments, repairs and service as necessary to keep the Equipment in normal running
order and to assure the continued comfort and safety of the facility occupants.  The
Contractor will avoid Interruptions of the facility operation, as well as any adverse
effect on the health or safety of the building occupants.  The Owner shall incur no
additional costs for such maintenance or repairs, except when the need for such service
is  due to improper operation or negligence by the Owner.
SECTION 12
EQUIPMENT OPERATION
The  Contractor shall at  all  times attempt to attain  the maximum energy  consumption
savings and associated cost  savings from the Equipment installed under this Agreement
and  from  pre-existing  equipment, which  may  include  recommendations to  improve the
existing methods for operating  and mafntaining the Owner's facility.  The Contractor
will, under no efrcumstances, operate and maintain such Equipment  in a manner which
will  reduce  the  standards  of comfort,  health  and  safety  as  defined  in Exhibit  1,
attached hereto and incorporated  by reference.
The Owner shall oporate the Equipment in compliance with the Contractor's instructions
and  shall  make  modifications  to  operation  only  through  written  approval  of  the
Contractor, unless en emergency situation exists.  The Owner will notify the Contractor
within  twenty-four  hours  of  any  emergency  or malfunction  in  the  operation  of  the
Equipment  or  of  any  interruption of  energy  which  may  effect  the  operation  of  the
Equip-ent.- 30  - AENDflK
The  Contractor may  replace  or upgrade Equipment for the purpose of maximizing energy
savings.  Such modification will require the written approval of the Owner, which shall
not  be  unreasonably  withheld  when  the  modification does  not  adversely  effect  the
facility operation.  Such  replecement, modification or addition shall be performed by
the Contrector at no cost to the Owner.
SECTION 13
GUARANTEE OF SAVINGS
The  Contractor shall guarantee  the Owner  that  the  facility energy costs plus costs
associated with payments to the Contractor for that same  period will be less then the
energy costs for that period before implementation  of energy conserving measures by the
Contractor.  The  guarantee  will  provide  for  a mutuatly  agreeeble minimum  level of
energy savings to the Ouner before payments to the Contractor become due.  In the event
the  energy savings do  not equal  the guaranteed minimum  level, the Contractor shalt
teimburse the Owner for the shortfall within ninety days of the annual anniversary date
of  implementation of the energy conserving project.  Such guarantee shall be written
with an Insurance firm familiar with third party financing of energy projects and will
achieve the  guaranteed minimum  level of savings.  The mutually agreeable guaranteed




The  Contractor assumes no responsibility or  liability and  shall not be  required to
compensate the Owner  for a shortfall  in energy cost savings as a  result of reduced
energy costs.  The  Contractor's liability to generate energy  cost savings shall be
based on  current energy  costs.  In the  event the quantity  saved  times the current
energy cost, due to reduced energy costs, does not equal or exceed the payment due the
Contractor, the Owner shalt use its best efforts to obtain additional adequate funds to
meet its obligations hereunder.  Increases in energy costs which may result in energy
cost  savings exceeding  the amount  required and guaranteed  for the purposes of this
Agreement will benefit the Owner and the Owner is  under no obligation to share these
windfall energy cost savings with the Contractor.
SECTION 15
PROJECT IhPLEhENTATION
The  Contractor  will  begin  installing  energy  conserving  equipment  and  will  begin
providing  energy  management  services  in the  Owner's facility  within  sixty  days  of
signing of this Agreement.  Such equipment will be fully installed within  …..... days
of  signing of  this  Agreement,  and  will  from  that  time  forward provide  the energy
savings described  in this Agreement.  Failure of the Contractor to install equipment
and reduce energy consumption within  days will be cause for default.  Such delays




The Contractor may  assign  or  transfer its rights and obligations stated herein  only
with the prior written consent of the Owner.  Owner consent will be provided only when
the assignees  agree  to honor the terms of this Agreement and other terms which may
arise  from  assignment  of Contractor rights and obligations.
SECTION 17
PERSONNEL TRAINING AND OTHER SERVICES
The Contractor will provide training to Owner personnel on the proper  operation and
maintenance  of any Equipment installed or modified under this Agreement.  Training may
atso  be  provided  on the proper operation and maintenance of existing equipment or on
other areas  of facility operation which may affect energy consumption.  Such training- 31  - APIXfl




The  Owner  may  at  any  time  terminate  this  Agreement  by  paying  for  the  Equipment
installed pursuant to this Agreement or by exercising the default remedies as  defined
in Section 23. Owner acquisition may not be sooner than one year after the effective
date  of this Agreement and will be accomplished by notifying  the Contractor not less
than ninety days prior to the intended date of acquisition.  Payment of the acquisition
value of the Equipment shall be the lesser  of the fair market value of the Equipment or
the  amount  calculated  pursuant  to  Exhibit  G,  attached  hereto  and  incorporated by
reference.  Acceptance of equipment is contingent upon Inspection and written approval
by the Owner and receipt of all related insurance documents and permits.
SECTION 19
LIABILITY INSURANCE
The Contractor will, at all times during the term of this Agreement, maintain  in full
force and effect, at its own expense, casualty and liability insurance on the Equipment
and liability insurance for  its other undertakings.  If any  item of the Equipment is
damaged or destroyed  by an event which  is covered by  insurance, the Contractor will
utilize the  insurance proceeds to repair or replace the Equipment.  If the  insurance
proceeds  are  insufficient or  if  the Equipment  has  been  damaged or destroyed  by an
uninsured  casualty,  the  Contractor  will  provide  the  necessary  funds  to  repair  or
replace the Equipment at no cost to the Owner.  Liability insurance will be maintained
as described in Exhibit H.
SECTION 20
BONDING
The Contractor will, at all times during the term of this Agreement, maintain in full
force and effect, at its own expense, a Payment and Performance Bond.
The Contractor shall make, execute and deliver to the Owner, prior to the commencement
of  any  work  under this agrement,  a good  and sufficient bond  with  a surety company,
conditioned  that  the  Contractor  shall  faithfully  perform  all  proviesions  of  this
Agreements and pay all laborers,  mechanics, and subcontractors  and materialmen, and all
persons who supply such person for the carrying on of work under this Agreement.  The
Bond shall be equal to the full contract amount agreed to be paid for such work, and
shall be to the State of  _  The Contractor shall indemnify the State of
against eny loss or  damage  directly due to the failure of the Contractor
to faithfully perform the conditions of the Agreement.




The Contractor shall protect,  indemnify, and save the Owner harmless from and against
any damage, cost or liability for injury or death to person or to damage or destruction
of  property,  arising  from  the  acts  of  the  Contractor,  his  employees  or  his
subcontractors in the performance of this Agreement.
If the  injuries, death or damages as provided In the preceding paragraph Is caused by
or results from the  concurrent negligence of (a) the  indemnitee or the  indemnitee's
agents or employees, the indemnity  provisions provfded in the preceding paragreph shall
be valid and enforceable only to the extent of the Indemnitor's  negligence.
The  Contractor  will  further  hold  harmless  the  Owner  from  all  fees,  taxes,  and
assessments which may be levied upon or with respect to the Equipment installed under
this Agreement, and shall hold the Owner harmless from any other charges which may be
imposed or incurred by any publfc or private authority with respect to the Equfpment or
Its operation.- 32  - APPENDIX
This  Agreement  shall  be  interpreted, construed  and  enforced  In  all  respects  in
accordance with the laws  of the State of ---------  In case of any Lawsuit, venue will
be in ........  County.
SECTION 22
LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION AND FISCAL FUNDING  OUT CLAUSE
The Owner s  obligation to pay any amounts due under this Agreement or to perform any
covenants requiring or resulting in expenditure of money are contingent and expressly
Limited  to  the  extent  of  legislative appropriations  made  to  fund  this  Agreement.
Nothing contained in any other Section of this Agreement shill be construed as creating
any  monetary  obligation on  the part  of  the Owner beyond  such  current and  specific
legislativ,  appropriations.
In the event that the Legsltature fails to appropriate the funds necessary to continue
this Agreement, the Agreement shall be terminated as to any obligations of the Owner
requiring the expenditure of money for which no such appropriation is available to the
end of the last fiscal year for which such appropriation is available.  In such event,
all obligations of the Owner will cease so long as all payments previously approved or
appropriated have  been  paid,  and  all  interest of  the  Owner  in the Equipment  will
terminate and this Agreemant shall be terminated.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Owner agrees not to terminate this Agreement under
this provision for the fiscal year in question.  If any future funds are appropriated
in order  to continue this Agreement, the Owner will use  its best efforts to obtain
inclusion  of such funds in its budget.
SECTION 23
EVENTS OF DEFAULT
Events  of  default by  the Owner.  Each  of  the following events  or conditions shall
constitute an "Event by Default" by the Owner:
a. Any failure by the Owner to pay the Contractor compensation as required by Section 7
and Exhibit D for a period of ninety days after the date of the invoice;
b. Any material failure by the Owner to comply with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement,  Including  breach  of  any  covenant contained  herein,  providing  that  such
failure  continues  for  thirty  days  after notice  to  the Owner  requesting  that  such
failure to perform be remedied, or if a remedy cannot be effected in such thirty  days,
without commencement of a remedy and diligent subsequent completion therefor;
c. Any voluntary discontinuation of use of more than  …...  percent of the facility in
which the Contractor has provided energy equipment and service for more than  ….... days
during  the  first  _  years  of  this Agreement  which would  thereby reduce energy
savings and  the Owner's  ability to make  payments to the Contractor as described  in
Exhibit D.
Events of default by the Contractor.  Each of the following events or conditions shall
constitute an "Event of Default" by the Contractor:
a. The Equipment fails to function properly or as described in Exhibit A;
b.  The  Contractor  fails  to  produce the  level of  energy  savings  guaranteed and as
described in Section 13;
c. The standards of comfort and service required are not provided due to failure of the
Contractor  to maintain,repair, or adjust the Equipment, or failure to provide other
services as  described  in Exhibit J and  sold failure continues  for thirty days after
written notice to the Contractor;
d. Any  material  failure by  the Contractor to perform or comply  with  the terms and
conditions  of  this Agreement, provided  that  such  foilure continues for  thirty days
after written notice to the Contractor demanding that such failure be cured, or if  a
cure  cannot  be  effected  in such  thirty  days,  without commencement  of  a  cure  ani
diligent subsequent completion.- 33  - APENDIX
Remedies.  In  the  event  of  default by  the Owner,  the  Contractor may  exercise  all
remedies  available  at  low or  at  equity  including  bringing  action  for  recovery of
amounts due and unpaid by the Owner.  Also, the Contractor may, without recourse to the
legal process,  terminate this Agreement by delivery of nctice declaring  termination,
enter  the  facility and  dismantle  and/or  remove the  Equipment  from  the facility and
reconnect and restore the Owner's equipment to the condition which existed prior to the
inception of the Agreement, normal wear and tear excepted.
In  the  event  of  default  by  the  Contractor,  the  Owner  may  exercise  all  remedies
available at law or at equity including  bringing action for recovery of amounts due to
the Owner, and/or for damages.  Also, the Owner may exercise its option to purchase the
Equipment for the acquisition value as set forth in Exhibit H.  Further, the Owner may,
without recourse to the legal process, terminate this Agreement by delivery of notice
declaring  termination,  whereupon  the  Contractor  shall  remove  the  Equipment  and
reconnect  and  restore the Owner's original equipment to the condition which existed
prior to the inception of this Agreement, normal wear and t::  exceted.
Liquidated Damages.  In the event of default by the Owner, the Owner shall be liable  to
the Contractor,  as  liquidated damages  in lieu of all  other claims  for damages, the
acquisition value of the Equipment as set forth in Exhibit G.  In the event of default
by  the  Contractor,  the Contractor  shall  be  liable  to  the  Owner,  for  "lost energy
vevings opportinities", as liquidated damages in lieu of all other claims for damages,
the following amounts:




All disputes, claims or questions subject to arbitration under  this Agrement and under
the  law shall  be  submitted  to  arbitration  in  accordance with  the provisions  then
obtaining, of  the Standard  Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Arbitration
association, and this Agreement shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing
arbitration  law, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in the state or
federaL court  having  jurisdiction.  It is mutually agreed  that  with  regard to  all
disputes, claims or questions subject to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrators
shall be a condition precedent to any right of legal action that either party may have
against the other.
Notice of the demand for arbitration of a dispute shall be filed in writing with the
other party within thirty (30) days of last written impasse.
This  Agreement,  together  with  the Exhibits  attached hereto, constitutes  the entire
Agreement  between the parties and this Agreement  shall not  be modified,  aLtered, or
changed except  to the extent agreed to by the parties in writing.  Any provision of
this Agreement found to be prohibited by law shall be ineffective  to the extent of such
prohibition without invalidating the remainder of this Agreement.  Nothing contained
herein  shall  be  construed  to  require  the  Owner  to  pay  for  additional  Equipment
installed  by  the  contractor  but  such  additional  transactions  shall  be  subject  to
negotiations  between  the  parties.  Subject  to  the  specific  provisions  of  this
Agreement,  this  Agreement  shall  be binding  upon  the  Insure to  the  benefit  of the
Doarties  and their respective successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF:  Owner and Contractor have caused this
Agreement to be executed by their respective officers duly
authorized.
OWNER:  CONTRACTOR:- 34  - APE3NDIX
EXHIBIT A
DESCRIPTION  OF EQUIPMENT
_____WNT-5;T:  m__  will  install and provide maintenance and  repair  for the Equipment
Item  Model
Description  Manufacturer  Number  Quantity
.,...................................................................................................................................  .
EXHIBIT B
FACILITY BASELINE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
The  parties agree that  the following  Baseline data  has been  determined  in a manner
which is  acceptable to the Owner and to the Contractor, and that the data is acceptable
for the purposes defined in this Agreement.
The baseline energy consumption shown in the three-year average energy consumption for
January  February  March  April  ect.
Number of Deys in Month
Electricity Consumed (kWh)
kWh/Day
Demand for Electricity (kw)
kw/Day
(other  energy consumed)
BTUs Consumed
BTUs/Day
Heating Degree Days Elapsed
Heating Degree Days/Day
Cooling Degree Days Elapsed
Cooling Degree Days/Day- 35  - APPRDD
EXHII9T  C
METHOD  OF  CALCULATING  ENERGY  SAVINGS
All energy  savings  produced  by energy  conserving  measures  under  this  Agreement  which
*re  affected  by  dcgree  day  changes  shall  be  normalized  for  such  weather  changes  and  the
energy  cost  savings  calculated  an follows:
A.  Calculate  Energy  Consumption.
1. For  each  energy  account  bill for  the  month  calculated  the  average  daily  energy
consumption  In units/day  by dividing  the  total  units  of energy  consumed  by  the  number
of  days  in  the  billing  period.
k. For  each  energy  account  bill  multiply  the  units/day  by the  number  of days  in  the
month.
3.  For  each  energy  account  bill,  sum  the  units  calcultated  in  A,2.
4. Electrical  demand  for the month will be the electrical  demand  usage for the
billing  month.
B.  Calculate  Energy  Savings.
1.  Subtract  the  total  amount  of energy  consumed  calculated  in  A,3  from  the  baseline
energy  consumption  for  that  month.
2.  Determine  the  energy  savings  as  done  in  3.1  for  each  type  of  energy.
3. Determine  the  electric  demand  savings  in units  of kw by subtracting  the  demand
calculated  In  A,4  from  the  baseline  demand  for  the  month.
C.  Calculate  Cost  Savings.
Calendar  month  energy  cost  savings  will  be  determined  by  applying  the  average  cost/unit
of  energy  to  the  energy  savings  in  the  following  manner:
1. For each energy account  bill calculate  the average  cost/unit  of energy by
dividing  the  total  amount  of the  bill  for  energy  by  the  total  units  of  energy  included
in  the  bill.
2. For all energy  account  bills calculate  the total  cost  of the  energy  consumed
during  the  calendar  month  by  multiplying  the  average  cost/unit  of  energy  by  the  energy
con*umption  for  the  energy.
3. For  each  type  of  energy  used  calculate  the  total  cost  savings  by  multiplying  the
average  cost/unit  of  that  energy  savings  in  units  of  that  *ner6g.
4. For each rate  schedule  with a demand  cost component,  calculate  the total  cost
savings  by multiplying  the  current  monthly  demand  unit  cost,  including  adjustments  to
base charge, by  the corresponding  demand savings for  the same rateaschedule  as
oAtermined  in  B3.3
S.  Calculate  the  total  cost  savings  during  the  calendar  month  in  question  as the  sum
of the total cost savings  for each type of energy  during the calendar  month as
calculated  under  C,3  & C,4  above.
0.  Adjustments  to  Calculated  Savings.
An  hourly  energy  simulation  kthermal  model)  program  will  be  used  to  estinate  energy  use
at baseline  operating  hours  and  at  actual  operating  hours. If  there  Is  a variation  in
the  actual  hours  of operation  of  more  than  10X  from  the  baseline  for  more  than  _  X of
the  year,  an  adjustment  will  be  made
for  actual  hours.  The ratio  of the  baseline  energy  use and the  estimated  actual  use
will  be  used  to  adjust  for  actual  hours.- 36  - AP990]X
EXNIIIT 0
CONTRACTOR PAYNENT
Compensation  for  _  services  described  herein  wilt  be  made





Year  Fuel Type  Fuel Savings  Cost Savings
- Based  on current costs.
EXHIBIT F
TRAINING AND OTHER CONTRACTOR SERVICES
…_  __*agrees  to provide the following training or other services:
EXHIBIT C
EQUIPNENT ACQUISITION VALUE
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INNISIT  W
COTRACTOE*S  LIADIL  ITY  INSURANCE
The  Contractor  shalt  obtain  oll insurance  required  horeunder,  and  euch Insurance  must
be approved  by the  Owner, prieor  to tho  commencement  of any  work  under  this  Agroement.
The  Contractor  witt  not  allow  any  oubcontractor  to  comaence  work  on a  subcontract  until
such  subcontractor  hae obtained  insurance  ol-llor  to that required  hereunder  for  the
Contractor.  Companles  writing  the  Insurance  under  this  Exhibit  shalt  be ieensed  to  do
business  in the State of  ______or  be pormitted  to do business  undor  the
Surplus  Lien  Law  of  the  $tate f  _
The  Contractor  ahatl  comply  with  the  State  Industrial  Insurance  Act,  the
Federal  Longshoremen's  and Narbor  Workiers  Act, and the Jonoe Act.  The Contractor
shall  purchase  and  maintain  during  the  tlfe of this  Agreement  Ustop-.apU  insurance  for
all  of its  employees  to  be  engaged  In  work  on this  project  under  this  Agreement.
The  Contractor  shall  take  out r  maintain,  during  the ifeo  of this  Agreement,  Sodlly
Injury Liability  and Property Damage  Liability  Insurance.  The Amoun.s of such
Insurance  shatl  not  be  less  than:
(a) Comprehensive  Cenerel eodlty  Injury  Liability  Inaurance
PER  PERSON  Pat  OCCURRENCE
s500.000  *1o000o000
Cb) Comprehensive  Property  Damage  Insurance
PER  PERSON  PER  OCCURRENCE
S500.000  1i.000000
Cc) Comprehensive  Automobile  Rodily  Injury  Insuraneo
PER PERSON  PaR  OCCURRENCE
5500,000  $1,000,000
Cd)  Comprehensive  Automobile  Property  Damage  Insurance
PER  OCCURRENCE
5500,000
te)  Contractors,  at thoir  option,  may purchase  comprehonsivo  goneral liability  and
property damage end comprehenoive  outomobile  bodily Injury and property damago
insurance  In a combfned  singl  limit  policy  not loss than One NiLLion  and No/100
Dollars (51,000.000.00)  per occurrence.  With respect  to projects  and completed
operations,  the  limit  of liability  wilt  opply  In  the  aggregate.
The insurance  coverage  under  this  Eahibit  shall  protect  the  Contractor  from  claims  for
damages  which  may arise  from  work  performed  under  this  Agreement,  whether  work  be by
contractor  or  by  any  subcontractor.
The State of  shltt  be namod  on alt certificates  of insurence  as an
Additional  Insured. The certificate  of insurance  shall  cover the work specified  in
this  Agreement  and  designated  undor  the  specific  contract  number.
No cancellation  of the  foreooing  poticies  shalt  be effective  uwthout  thirty  (30)  days
prior  notice  to  the  Owner.- 38  - APPENDIX
EXHIDIT  I
STANDARDS OF SERVICE AND CONFORT
onIliTr  a  asaset  grees  to  eaintain  for  the  term  of  th10  Agreement  environmental
cd  ;no,  *o  oot  rth hereunder.
Ninimum room  temperature  during occupied hours during heating oeoson:
Moximum  room temperature  during occupied hours during cooling season:
Minimum domostic hot water temperature  .___..__




Occupied hours heating season:
Month/Day  Operating Hours
Occupied hours cooling se&son:
Nonth/Day  Operating HoursPPR  Working  Paper  Series
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